




Auditing Economic Policy in the Light of Obligations on 
Economic and Social Rights 
 




One of the things we have learned so far is that the realization of human rights, especially 
economic and social rights, requires resources as well as laws. The availability and use of 
resources is strongly influenced by the type of economic policies that States Parties 
implement.  This paper considers how concerned citizens might audit economic policies 
from a human rights perspective, with a particular focus on economic and social rights.  
It draws on an ongoing project, directed by Radhika Balakrishnan, advised by Diane 
Elson, and funded by the Ford Foundation, on economic policy and economic and social 
rights in Mexico and the USA.  The project brings together human rights experts and 
activists who are focussing on economic and social rights, and economists who are 
critical of the neo-liberal economic policies being pursued by so many governments and 
international economic policy institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank. (Amartya 
Sen has called these critical economists ‘non-conformist economists’, because they do 
not conform to the currently dominant forms of economic analysis and policy 
prescription). These economists share the concerns of the human rights community 
about poverty, deprivation and inequality; and draw on a range of other approaches to 
economic policy, including Keynesian, human development and feminist economics 
approaches. The project aims to audit key economic polices in the two countries in the 
light of human rights obligations, and the analysis produced by ‘non-conformist’ 
economists.  
 
1.  The Tension between Neoclassical Economics and Human Rights  
 We begin with the perspective of neoclassical economics (the economics that underpins 
neo-liberal economic policies). Neoclassical economics and human rights standards judge 
the operation of economies in very different ways, and there is some tension between 
them.1 In neoclassical economics, economies are judged in terms of a utilitarian 
framework, in which the best policies are those that maximize benefits and minimize 
costs. The actions of governments are typically presumed to entail the imposition of 
costs, in terms of a loss of efficiency (measured in terms of outputs of goods and 
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services) compared with what could be achieved by competitive markets. In the jargon of 
neoclassical economics, government actions typically ‘distort’ the operation of 
economies, compared with the benchmark of a competitive market economy, assumed to 
be able to operate without any government intervention. Such actions can only be 
justified if there are benefits stemming from the action that outweigh its costs.  
Here is an example of such logic applied to education: 
To finance better-quality schooling for those who have the least educated 
parents, and who attend the worse schools, it may be necessary to raise taxes on 
other people. The basic economic insight that such taxation distorts incentives 
remains valid. Such policies should be implemented only to the extent that the 
(present) value of the long-run benefits of greater equity exceed the efficiency 
costs of funding them.2  
Benefits and costs are typically measured using a money-metric. Education is typically 
valued in terms of additions to a  person’s expected  future lifetime earnings, placing a 
low value on education of  people whose expected future lifetime earnings are low, and 
no value on people for whom such earnings are zero.   
A very different logic is found in the human rights approach to education:  
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
education……. 
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to 
achieving the full realization of this right: 
 (a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all…… 
(b) Secondary education ……shall be made generally available and accessible to 
all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction 
of free education….3 
The same tension can be found if we look at the economy as a whole. Neoclassical 
economics judges the benefits of economic policies in terms of maximizing the output of 
goods and services, as measured by the level and rate of growth of the country’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). It is assumed that rapid economic growth will lift people out 
of poverty, and that private ownership and market competition are likely to be the best 
mechanisms for maximizing economic growth. (This belief is what underpins the 
advocacy of privatization of public enterprises and services, and liberalization of 
markets).  If some people are left behind, or indeed made worse-off,  by policies aimed at 
maximizing national output, then it is assumed that ‘winners’ can compensate ‘losers’, for 
instance via taxation and public expenditure ( though these instruments must be used in a 
way that minimizes so-called ‘distortions’). This might be described as a strategy of ‘first 
maximize the size of the pie, then hope that it will be sliced up in such a way that nobody 
is made worse off’.  Note that this approach is indifferent as to whether the losers are 
people who are already very rich, or very poor. Each is equally deserving of 
compensation.  Nor does it pay much attention to the likelihood of compensation 
actually taking place.  If the policy measures are expected to produce the maximum 
possible extra output, then that is enough for them to be judged ‘optimal’.  
Not all economists share the assumptions or goals of neoclassical economics and 
the neo-liberal policies that derive from such economics.  Progressive, non-conformist 
economists outside the mainstream challenge these views.4 Such economists argue that 
 
2 World Bank, World Development Report 2006 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2006) at 22. 
3 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 13, para. 2 
4 For more information on  non-conformist economics, see www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/hetecon and 
www.heterodoxeconomics.net and www.iaffe.org. 
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the policies of privatization and market liberalization advocated by neoclassical 
economists are not likely to maximize economic growth, much less reduce inequality. 
They point to the inherent riskiness and uncertainty of private enterprise and market 
competition; and argue that most successful cases of rapid economic growth have in fact 
been achieved with leadership from the state, to provide the appropriate incentives and 
infrastructure and security. They also question whether it is possible to separate 
production and distribution. The process of production produces ‘winners’ who tend to 
resist any redistribution of their gains to those who are ‘losers’. The way in which the pie 
is produced constrains the way in which it can be sliced. Progressive economists urge 
attention to poverty and inequality in the design and implementation of policies to 
increase production, and not just as an afterthought in considering the distribution of 
production. The feminists and environmentalists among progressive economists urge 
attention to the non-market aspects of economies, and resist the application of the 
money-metric to all uses of resources.  They challenge neoclassical concepts of efficiency 
as partial and faulty, because they fail to take into account unpaid work and natural 
resources. There are many potential intersections between the concerns of progressive 
economists and the concerns of human rights experts and advocates. However, the latter 
are very often unaware that not all economists are neoclassical economists, while the 
former tend to be unaware of the moral and legal standards provided by the human 
rights perspective, and the fact that states have human rights obligations.5  
The human rights perspective uses as a standard the realization of the individual 
human rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The 
treaties that stem from the UDHR set out the obligations of governments towards these 
rights. The obligations implied by international human rights instruments have been 
spelled out more fully though a number of mechanisms, including General Comments 
and General Recommendations issued from time to time by United Nations (UN) treaty 
monitoring bodies and by experts in international law, such as the groups of experts who 
produced the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1986) and the Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1997).  
Particularly useful is the framework set out in the Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which differentiates three 
dimensions of obligations:  
The obligation to respect requires states to refrain from interfering with the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. Thus the right to housing is 
violated if the State engages in arbitrary forced evictions. 
The obligation to protect requires States to prevent violations of such rights by 
third parties. Thus the failure to ensure that private employers comply with basic 
labour standards may amount to a violation of the right to work or the right to 
just and favourable conditions of work. 
The obligation to fulfil requires States to take appropriate legislative, 
administrative, budgetary, judicial and other measures towards the full realization 
of such rights.  Thus, the failure of States to provide essential primary health care 
to those in need may amount to a violation. 
Each of these obligations contains elements of obligations of conduct, and obligations of 
result.6  The Maastricht Guidelines explain these obligations thus: 
 
5 R. Balakrishnan, Why MES with Human Rights? Integrating Macro Economic Strategies with Human Rights (New 
York: Marymount Manhattan College, 2004). 
6 See CESCR General Comment 3, The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, 1999. 
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The obligation of conduct requires action reasonably calculated to realize the 
enjoyment of a particular right. …The obligation of result requires States to 
achieve specific targets to satisfy a detailed substantive standard.  
States have accepted these obligations but they do not usually explicitly bear human 
rights in mind in the operation of their economic policies: human rights are typically seen 
as the responsibility of Ministries like the Justice Ministry, not of the Finance Ministry.  
However, at the UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, 
governments did recognize that human rights are ‘the first responsibility of 
governments’.7  If this is the case, what are the key human rights principles that could be 
used to provide a framework to audit how far economic policies are in fulfilment of this 
responsibility, with a particular focus on economic and social rights?  Some ideas on this 
are presented in the next section.  
The obligations of states extend beyond their own borders, as is made clear in the 
UN Charter, Articles 55 and 56.  Obligations with respect to international development 
co-operation between governments are explicitly referred to in Article 2 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and 
underlined in specific provisions in Article 11 (right to an adequate standard of living). 
Articles 22 and 23 specifically refer to the need for international measures. In 1990  the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General Comment 3 
explicitly stated that: ‘international co-operation for development … is an obligation of 
all States’. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has subsequently produced a 
number of reports on trade and investment clarifying that international trade and 
investment agreements must be consistent with the human rights obligations of States.8  
Inter-governmental organizations are also bound by human rights norms and 
standards. UN organizations such as UNICEF, UNIFEM and WHO have organized 
much of their work in relation to ICRC, CEDAW, 9 and the Right to Health, 
respectively. The international financial organizations, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank, have until recently paid little attention to human rights.  The 
World Bank has recently reco
The Articles of Agreement permit, and in some cases require, the Bank to 
recognize the human rights dimensions of its development policies and activities, 
since it is now evident that human rights are an intrinsic part of the Banks’ 
mission.10  
However, the Bank still favours a legalistic interpretation of what that means. The 
current General Counsel, Ana Palacio, puts it thus: 
The Bank’s analytical work can benefit from a systematic inclusion of human 
rights considerations and the broadened range of legal analysis these require. 
Areas such as governance or the legal empowerment of the poor are particularly 
relevant in this respect.11  
This approach does not take into account the possibility that the conditions attached to 
loans by the World Bank (and the IMF) may themselves be in breach of obligations. 
 
7 Vienna Declaration, Part I, para. 1. 
8 See for instance, Report E/CN.4/2002/54 which focuses on trade in agriculture and Report 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9 which focuses on investment. 
9 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF); United Nations Development Fund for Women 
(UNIFEM); World Health Organization (WHO); International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 
10 D. Robert, ‘Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the Work of the World Bank’, 2006 Development 
Outreach, October.  
11 A. Palacio, ‘The Way Forward: Human Rights and the World Bank’, 2006 Development Outreach, October. 
  
 
                                                    Auditing Economic Policy                                                     5 
 
                                                
 
2.  Human Rights Principles Relevant to Auditing Economic Policy 
States enjoy a margin of discretion in selecting the means to carry out their obligations. 
However, in discharging their obligations for the realization of economic and social 
rights, states must pay regard to the following key points:  the requirement for 
progressive realization; the use of maximum available resources; the avoidance of 
retrogression; the satisfaction of minimum essential levels of economic and social rights; 
non-discrimination and equality; and participation, transparency and accountability. 
These principles can be used as a framework for auditing economic policy. 
2.1  Progressive Realization 
The ICESCR specifies that States Parties have the obligation of ‘achieving progressively 
the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant’ ‘to the maximum of 
available resources’. This obligation does recognize that the resources at the disposition 
of a government are not unlimited, and that fulfilling economic and social rights will take 
time. At the same time, the concept of ‘progressive realization’ is not intended to take 
away all ‘meaningful content’ of a State’s obligation to realize economic, social and 
cultural rights.12 Progressive realization imposes a ‘specific and continuing’13 or ‘constant 
and continuing’14 duty to move as ‘expeditiously and effectively as possible’15 towards full 
realization of rights. These steps toward full realization of rights must be ‘taken within a 
reasonably short time after the Covenant’s entry into force for the States concerned’ and 
such steps should be ‘deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible’ in order to 
meet the obligations of States.16  
2.2  Maximum Available Resources 
The definition of the ‘maximum available resources’ which the government should utilize 
for ‘progressive realization’ of human rights, has not yet been fully elaborated. CESCR 
made a statement in 2007 entitled ‘An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take  Steps to the 
“Maximum of Available Resources” Under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant’.  
However, the statement did not define what constitutes ‘available resources’, beyond 
stating that it refers to ‘both the resources existing within a state as well as those available 
from the international community through international cooperation and assistance’.17   
 It seems reasonable to argue that ‘maximum available resources’ depends not 
only on the level of output of an economy, its rate of growth, and the level and growth 
of inflows of resources from other economies. It also depends on how the state 
mobilizes resources from the people living under its jurisdiction to fund its obligation to 
fulfil human rights. For instance, if a state generates very little revenue, it will be able to 
provide only limited public services. The key role of taxation has been noted by some of 
the UN Special Rapporteurs on human rights.  For instance, the Special Rapporteur on 
the right to education has noted that ‘It is hard to imagine how any state would raise the 
revenue to finance health, education, water, and sanitation, or assistance for those too 
young or too old to work, were it not for taxation.’18 Another Special Rapporteur who 
 
12 CESCR, General Comment 3, para. 9 
13 CESCR, General Comment 12, para. 44 
14 CESCR, General Comment 15, para. 18 
15 CESCR, General Comment 3, para. 9; CESCR, General Comment 12, para. 44; CESCR, General 
Comment 15, para. 18 
16 CESCR, General Comment 3, para. 2; CESCR, General Comment 12, para. 43; CESCR, General 
Comment 14, para. 30; CESCR, General Comment 15, para. 17 
17 E/C.12/2007/1 
18 K. Tomasevski, ‘Has the Right to Education a Future Within the United Nations? A Behind-the-Scenes 
Account by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education 1998-2004’, (2005) 5 Human Rights Law 
Review 2 at 205-237 
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has commented on taxation is Philip Aston, Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions. In a statement of the Human Rights Council in March 
2007, he comments that in Guatemala  
The reason the executive branch of the Guatemalan State has so little money to 
spend on the criminal justice system is that the Congress resist the imposition of 
all but the most perfunctory taxes. To put this in perspective, as a percentage of 
GDP, Guatemala’s total tax revenue in 2005 was 9.6 per cent of GDP. By 
regional comparison, its percentage tax revenue is lower than that of Belize, 
Costa Rica, El  Salvador, Honduras, or Nicaragua, and radically lower than that 
of the countries of South America.   
Of course, the system of taxation must be organized so as to comply with human rights 
standards. Tomasevski notes that the European Court of Human Rights has legitimised 
the power of states to levy taxes, provided that judicial remedies exist  to prevent taxation 
amounting to arbitrary confiscation. She further notes that ‘[t]he human rights 
jurisprudence regarding taxation has affirmed the principle of ability to contribute’.19 
Taxation must also be non-discriminatory as between different social groups, such as 
women and men.   
2.3  Non-Retrogression 
There is a strong presumption that retrogressive measures on the part of a State are not 
permitted. An example of a potentially retrogressive measure would be cuts to 
expenditures on public services that are critical for realization of economic and social 
rights; or cuts to taxes that are critical for funding such services. If such retrogressive 
measures are deliberate, then the State has to show that they have been ‘introduced after 
consideration of all alternatives and are fully justifiable by reference to totality of rights 
provided for in the Covenant and in context of the full use of the maximum of available 
resources’.20 For example, cutting government spending on health and education, while 
not cutting expenditure on arms is likely to violate the principle of non-retrogression. 
2.4  Minimum Essential Levels/Minimum Core Obligations 
States that are parties to the ICESCR are also under a ‘minimum core’ obligation to 
ensure, at the very least, the satisfaction of  ‘minimum essential levels of each of the 
rights’ in the ICESCR. This means that a state party in which any ‘significant number’ of 
persons is ‘deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, etc. is prima 
facie failing to meet obligations’ under the Covenant.21  The Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights has clarified that this is a continuing obligation, requiring states 
with inadequate resources to strive to ensure enjoyment of rights.22 However, even in 
times of severe resource constraints, states must ensure that rights are fulfilled for 
vulnerable members of society.23 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights has begun to identify the content of the minimum core obligations with respect to 
the rights to food, education, health, and water though it has not specified this in 
quantitative terms.24 The provision of minimum essential levels is an immediate 
obligation. This means that it is the duty of the state to prioritize the rights of the poorest 
and most vulnerable people. Nevertheless, this does not imply that states must adopt a 
very narrowly targeted approach, using special programmes that are only for the very 
 
19 Ibid. 
20 CESCR, General Comment 3, para. 9; CESCR, General Comment 12, para. 45; CESCR, General 
Comment 14, para. 32; CESCR, General Comment 15, para. 19. 
21 CESCR, General Comment 3, para. 10. 
22 CESCR, General Comment 3, para. 11. 
23 CESCR, General Comment 3, para. 12; General Comment 12, para. 28; General Comment 14, para. 18. 
24 CESCR, General Comments Nos. 11, 13, 14 and 15 respectively. 
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poor. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has emphasized that ‘the 
obligation remains for a State party to strive to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of 
the relevant rights’.25  Several UN Special Rapporteurs have highlighted the importance 
of broad based systems as the best way to meet minimum core obligations. 
2.5  Non-discrimination and Equality 
A fundamental aspect of states’ human rights obligations is that of non-discrimination 
and equality. Article 2 of the UDHR states that: ‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.’  The same language is used in Article 2 of the ICESCR. 
Several human rights treaties specifically deal with non-discrimination in relation 
to particular categories of people. For instance, CEDAW prohibits discrimination against 
women in all its forms and obligates States to condemn this discrimination and take steps 
‘by all appropriate means and without delay’ to pursue a policy of eliminating this 
discrimination (Article 2). Article 2 of CEDAW also sets out steps that a State party must 
take to eliminate this discrimination, including adopting appropriate legislative and other 
measures. Article 4(1) recognizes the legitimacy of ‘temporary special measures aimed at 
accelerating de facto equality between men and women’. It is clear that CEDAW not only 
means the absence of a discriminatory legal framework, but also means that policies must 
not be discriminatory in effect.  CEDAW requires that states achieve both substantive 
and formal equality and recognizes that formal equality alone is insufficient for a state to 
meet its affirmative obligation to achieve substantive equality between men and women.26 
In the same vein Article 2 of the International Convention for the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) requires that States Parties condemn racial 
discrimination and pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of 
eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms. The state is also obliged to take special 
and concrete measures to ensure the adequate development and protection of certain 
racial groups or individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the 
full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These measures 
cannot maintain unequal or separate rights for different racial groups.27 CERD further 
elaborates that in compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in Article 2 of 
this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial 
discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction 
as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the 
enjoyment of economic social and cultural rights.28  
Less attention has been paid to the fact that that both UDHR and ICESCR 
specify  ‘property’ among the grounds on which ‘distinction’ in the enjoyment of rights is 
not permitted. MacNaughton points out that it has been accepted that this refers to the 
wealth or poverty status of people, and that distinction on the basis of wealth or poverty 
very often overlaps with distinction on the basis of other statuses, such as race and ethnic 
origin.29 Poor people are often disproportionately from particular status groups.  
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has made it clear that 
the recognition that realization will be ‘progressive’ does not provide states with an 
excuse for the persistence of discrimination. States have an obligation to ‘guarantee’ that 
 
25 CESCR, General Comment 3, para 11. 
26 CEDAW, General Recommendation 25, para. 8. 
27 CERD, Art. 2, para. 2. 
28 CERD, Art. 5, para. E. 
29 G. MacNaughton, ‘Concepts of Equality in Law’, mimeo, 2007. 
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there will be no discrimination in the exercise of rights.30 This means that non-
discrimination must always be a priority in the progressive realization of economic, social 
and cultural rights and that any steps that a state takes to progressively realize such rights 
must be non-discriminatory in both policy and effect. Like provision of minimum 
essential levels, non-discrimination is an immediate obligation. 
2.6  Accountability, Participation and Transparency 
The importance of accountability and participation is emphasized in the Limburg 
Principles on the implementation of ICESCR. The Principles state that: 
States Parties are accountable both to the international community and to their 
own people for their compliance with the obligations under the Covenant. 
A concerted national effort to invoke the full participation of all sectors of 
society is, therefore indispensable to achieving progress in realizing economic, 
social and cultural rights. Popular participation is required at all stages, including 
the formulation, application and review of national policies. 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has indicated that the right of 
individuals to participate must be an ‘integral component’ of any policy or practice that 
seeks to meet the State’s obligation to ensure the equal right of men and women to the 
enjoyment of all human rights.31 
In a statement on poverty and the ICESCR, the Committee has stated that: ‘the 
international human rights normative framework includes the right of those affected by 
key decisions to participate in the relevant decision-making processes.’32 It has also 
emphasized that: ‘rights and obligation demand accountability…whatever the 
mechanisms of accountability, they must be accessible, transparent and effective’.33  
Accountability, participation and transparency require information. Article 19 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights refers to the right to receive and impart 
information. This is further elaborated in Article 19 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights has drawn attention to the significance of the right to information for economic 
and social rights.  
 
3.  Conducting a Human Rights Audit of Economic Policy in a Country, in 
Relation to Economic and Social Rights 
In conducting an audit, we suggest the following stages: 
• select the economic polices to be considered; 
• identify which of the principles set out in the above section apply most directly to 
the selected policies; 
• identify relevant indicators to assess how far obligations of conduct are being 
met;  
• identify indicators of results in realizing economic and social rights, and use them 
to cross check indicators of conduct where appropriate. 
 
30 ICESCR, Article 2(2); CESCR, General Comment 3, para. 2; CESCR, General Comment 12, para. 43; 
CESCR, General Comment 14, para. 31; CESCR, General Comment 15, para 17 
31 CESCR, General Comment 16, para. 37. See further General Comment 14, para. 54; General Comment 
15, paras. 16(a) and 48. 
32 United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2001, para.12, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/2001/10. 
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In the project from which this paper is drawn, the policies selected are public 
expenditure, taxation, fiscal and monetary policy (budget deficits/surpluses, interest and 
exchange rates etc.), international trade agreements, and regulation of non-state actors 
(using the case of pension reform). The use of these policy instruments affects the 
economy as whole, and has implications for all economic and social rights, though some 
specific policy instruments may have a more direct relation with some rights than others. 
In choosing policy instruments as our entry point, rather than the enjoyment of specific 
rights, we are in agreement with those who have argued that the assessment of states’ 
compliance with obligations for economic and social rights should pay particular 
attention to obligations of conduct.34 
We draw a distinction between an audit and a study of policy impact. The latter 
purports to establish a causal link between economic policies and the degree of 
substantive enjoyment of economic and social rights (‘results’). Impact studies require the 
use of quite complex mathematical models and econometric techniques, combined with 
assumptions about ‘counter-factuals’ (i.e. what would have happened if different 
economic policies had been used). The technical apparatus of studies that purport to 
examine impact often obscure the nature of the ‘guesstimates’ that have been made in 
constructing the ‘counter-factuals’.  Moreover, no impact study can definitely establish 
causation; it can only establish correlation and suggest plausible reasons for interpreting 
this as evidence of causation. An audit has a less ambitious aim: to examine how policy 
has been conducted - whether it has consisted of action ‘reasonably calculated to realize 
the enjoyment of a particular right’, selecting rights which might reasonably be thought 
to have a strong relation to the policy instrument.  Such an audit can use both 
quantitative indicators and a qualitative examination of relevant legislation and policy 
processes. It is best conducted by a team that includes both human rights experts and 
activists and progressive economists and activists for economic justice. 
Where appropriate, the analysis of conduct can be cross-checked with a 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of relevant ‘results’ for some relevant rights. The data 
on ‘results’ may reinforce or challenge the conclusions about the conduct of policy. For 
example, in considering public expenditure, we may examine whether public expenditure 
on health might be considered to be ‘action reasonably calculated to realize’ the right to 
health in a way that complies with obligations for non-discrimination and equality. If we 
find that public expenditure is very unequally distributed between different social groups, 
this suggests a prime facie case of failure to meet obligation of conduct. We can cross 
check this with data on the health status of different social groups (which measure some 
dimension of how far they enjoy particular levels of the right to health).  If we find the 
health status of the group with the lowest share of expenditure is worse than those 
groups with higher shares of expenditure, this suggests that the government is indeed in 
violation of its obligations of conduct. But if the social group with the lowest share of 
public expenditure has the highest health status, then this suggest that the needs for 
public health services of this group are lower, and thus the government may be justified 
in the conduct of health expenditure. None of this implies that health expenditure is the 
only form of public expenditure that has an impact on the right to health, or that public 
expenditure is the only economic policy instrument that has an impact on the right to 
health.  The enjoyment of the right to health is the outcome of numerous factors, and 
the audit does not seek to establish what those factors are. It has the more modest goal 
of investigating whether policy on public expenditure appears to be in compliance with 
obligations on the right to health.  
 
34 For example, K. Rowarth,  ‘Measuring Human Rights’ (2001) 15 Ethics and International Affairs 1 at 111-
132. 
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In choosing indicators and making judgments, it is important to be mindful of 
the need to take into account differences of context. As Rowarth points out, when 
examining compliance with obligations for progressive realization of economic and social 
rights, it is not appropriate to compare countries with different levels of wealth against 
the same set of ‘results’ using some absolute standard (e.g. full enrolment of all children 
in school).35  Indicators should be chosen with this in mind, focussing on benchmarking 
with comparable countries; benchmarking in the same countryover time; and 
benchmarking between different social groups in the same country.  
In cross-checking conduct and results, it is relevant to pay attention, where 
appropriate, to qualitative indicators of the institutional system that links economic policy 
to enjoyment of economic and social rights. Is there a relatively secure link, such as is 
provided by a system of universal citizen entitlements to public provision, specified in 
legislation, possibly in the constitution? Or a less secure link, based on targeted 
entitlements, only available on a means-tested basis to the poorer groups? Or a reliance 
on families, communities, charities and churches to provide a minimum essential level of 
the rights?  Are the institutional links different for different rights?   
The empirical evidence across a wide range of countries suggests that the most 
effective way of reducing poverty is through ‘targeting within universalism’ in which 
there are strong universal entitlements, plus extra benefits directed to low income 
groups.36 
In conducting the audit, it is important to examine not only the conduct of the 
state in question, but also the extent to which it is enabled or constrained by international 
agreements on trade and finance with other governments, with international financial 
institutions, and with multinational corporations. Responsibility for any shortcomings 
may not rest entirely with the government in question, but may be shared with other 
bodies. This is more likely to be the case in poor, small countries than in rich and 
powerful ones, but even in the latter multinational corporations may share some of the 
responsibility. 
A possible framework for an audit is now set out (owing to limitations in space it 
omits the issue of regulation of non-state actors). It is important to bear in mind that 
human rights obligations do not directly prescribe a particular mix of private and public 
action (as noted in paragraph 8 of the CESCR General Comment 3 on the nature of 
States Parties’ obligations).  But it is clear that they do require states to adopt that mix of 
public action, and incentives for and regulation of private action, that will best address 
both immediate obligations and progressive realization. Non-conformist economists 
have provided ample evidence that private enterprise and market forces cannot be relied 
upon to produce outcomes that satisfy the immediate obligations for non-discrimination 
and equality, and minimum core standards. To achieve this private enterprise and market 
forces need to be carefully regulated by the state and complemented by a substantial and 
well-functioning public sector. The realization of economic and social rights requires 
more than a minimalist state. Indeed, as the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to 
education has noted: ‘The raison d’etre of economic and social rights is to act as correctives 
to the free market’.37 In providing this corrective, a state must, of course, also respect, 
protect, and fulfil civil and political rights.  
 
35 Ibid. 
36 T. Mkandawire, ‘Targeting and Universalism in Poverty Reduction’, in J.A. Ocampo, Jomo K.S. and S. 
Khan (eds), Policy Matters: Economic and Social Policies to Sustain Equitable Development  (London: Zed Books 
Ltd, 2007) 
37 K. Tomasevski, Background Paper submitted by Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 19th Session, E/C.12/1998/18, 1998. 
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3.1 Public Expenditure 
Neo-liberal economists tend to believe that public expenditure displaces private 
expenditure, and are concerned that expansion of public expenditure will be inflationary 
and harm economic growth. They tend to believe that the costs outweigh the benefits. 
Progressive economists dispute this. They argue that public expenditure is 
complementary to, not competitive with, private expenditure; that it is not necessarily 
inflationary; and that it promotes economic growth. States have an obligation to use 
public expenditure in ways that respect, protect and fulfil human rights. Fulfilment of 
human rights is particularly likely to require public expenditure, given the riskiness of 
markets. 
3.1.1  Progressive Realization and Non-retrogression 
Obligation of conduct  
The audit needs to establish whether a government is spending less or more than its 
peers; and whether it is increasing or decreasing the share of GDP that goes to public 
expenditure. Relevant quantitative indicators include: ratio of public expenditure to 
GDP, in comparison to countries with comparable GDP per capita; ratio of public 
expenditure to GDP over time; shares of health, education, social welfare etc. in public 
expenditure; in relation to comparable countries, and over time; and real per capita 
expenditure (total and for health, education, social welfare etc.)  in relation to comparable 
countries, and over time. In addition, it would be pertinent to establish whether there are 
citizen entitlements to public services and income transfers.38 Is their scope expanding or 
contracting over time? How easy is it to exercise them? What proportion of these 
entitlements are universal and what proportion is targeted to particular individuals or 
groups? What method of targeting is used (e.g. means testing, age, gender, self-selection)? 
Obligation of result  
An array of indicators of wellbeing outcomes is required, relating to specific rights, such 
as education, health, food and housing, with comparisons to other countries of similar 
per capita GDP, and taking into account changes over time.  
Conclusion 
Compliance with obligations is questionable if public expenditure is low compared to 
other similar countries and is falling over time, and if at the same time, well-being 
indicators are low and falling. Responsibility for non-compliance may be shared with 
other governments and international financial institutions if the latter are unreasonably 
constraining public expenditure. (Progressive economists argue that the IMF is currently 
putting inappropriate constraints on the public expenditure of some governments of 
some small, poor countries, as a condition for access to its funds).  
3.1.2  Non-discrimination and Equality 
Obligation of conduct  
The audit needs to assess the distribution of expenditure between different social groups. 
In some cases equal shares will be an appropriate benchmark, but not always, as 
differences in needs, deprivations, and preferences must be taken into account.39 It is 
also important to consider the distribution of entitlements: are entitlements limited to 
particular groups? (e.g. citizens or non citizens, employed and unemployed, social 
security for those who pay contributions into the system, discretionary social assistance 
for those who do not). How secure are the entitlements of different groups and what 
kinds of redress do different groups have? 
 
38 R. Balakrishnan, n. 5 above, at 21. 
39 D. Elson, n. 1 above, at 53. 
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Obligation of result  
The audit should consider indicators of rights-related wellbeing outcomes of different 
groups in the population (disaggregating by race, gender, ethnicity, citizenship, location, 
and so on) to establish whether the gaps between groups are reducing or increasing over 
time.   
Conclusion  
Compliance with obligations is questionable if the shares of the most deprived groups are 
lower than the better-off groups, and their entitlements are less secure. 
3.1.3  Minimum Core Obligations 
Obligation of conduct  
To ensure it is meeting this obligation, a state should have in place an adequate  system 
of setting benchmarks for and monitoring the enjoyment of minimum essential levels of 
economic and social rights (such as a suitably defined poverty line). There should also be 
a system providing entitlements to the minimum essential level of income, food, shelter 
etc.  
 Obligation of result   
There should be no section of the population that is deprived of minimum essential 
levels of enjoyment of economic and social rights. Indicators are needed of the wellbeing 
of the most deprived people, and whether their numbers are increasing or decreasing: for 
instance, the proportion of the population below the poverty line, over time, and in 
relation to comparable countries. 
Conclusion 
Compliance with obligations is questionable if the poverty line is set too low and there is 
no well-functioning system of entitlements, and if the proportion of the population 
below the poverty line is high and rising. 
3.1.4 Transparency, Accountability and Participation 
Obligation of conduct  
Governments should publish information on public expenditure in a format that can be 
easily understood. There should be an effective financial audit process; legislative scrutiny 
of expenditure; and scope for democratic public participation in decision-making on 
public expenditure. The budget transparency index constructed by the International 
Budget Project is a relevant indicator. 
Obligation of result  
Citizens should be able to exercise their right to information about public expenditure, by 
requesting and obtaining specific information. 
Conclusion 
Compliance with obligations is questionable if information is hard to obtain or 
confusing; if financial audit and scrutiny mechanisms are weak; and if ordinary citizens 
have little scope for participation in decisions on public expenditure. 
3.2 Taxation 
Neoclassical economists consider that most ways of raising tax revenue create 
‘distortions’ and introduce inefficiencies. The only tax that does not do so is a poll tax (a 
fixed sum paid for each person, irrespective of their circumstances, and regardless of 
differences in ability to pay). Progressive economists question this view of taxation, 
arguing that it uses an irrelevant benchmark - a market economy without any public 
services or infrastructure- and an excessively limited concept of efficiency. Adequate tax 
revenue needs to be raised to fund the expenditure required for realization of economic 
and social rights, though there is, of course, an obligation to raise it in ways that respect 
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human rights. Taxation is appropriately audited in relation to obligations of conduct, as 
results in achieving particular levels of enjoyment of economic and social rights are more 
closely linked to expenditure.  
3.2.1 Maximum Available Resources  
Obligation of conduct  
The obligation is to introduce and implement tax laws and tax administration that are 
capable of generating sufficient revenue for the realization of economic and social rights, 
in ways that comply with human rights obligations. Relevant indicators include: ratio of 
tax revenue to GDP over time and in comparison to similar countries; and amount of tax 
revenue forgone, owing to tax concessions, holidays, loopholes etc.   
Conclusion 
Compliance with obligations is questionable if tax revenue levels are relatively low  and 
falling over time. The responsibility for this may be shared with multinational 
corporations which take measures to avoid paying taxes, by transferring their profits to 
tax havens; and with international financial institutions that make reduction of taxes on 
imports a condition for loans in circumstances where it is difficult to replace the revenue 
thereby lost.40  
3.2.2 Non-discrimination and Equality 
Obligation of conduct  
The obligation is to ensure that tax laws and collection measures do not discriminate and 
that they affect different social groups equitably. Among the important quantitative 
indicators are the shares of tax revenue paid by different groups (people compared to 
corporations; rich compared to poor); and the incidence of taxation (the amount that 
people pay in taxes as a proportion of their income), on different social groups. Relevant 
qualitative evidence concerns the structure of tax laws and their implementation: for 
example, do the income tax laws discriminate on the basis of gender, sexual orientation, 
types of household, citizenship, or civil status?41 Are taxpayers of all social groups treated 
equally in the implementation of tax laws? Or are there tax loopholes that benefit the rich 
and enable them to move their resources overseas?42 
Conclusion 
Compliance with obligations is questionable if a much bigger proportion of tax revenue 
is paid by people than by corporations; the incidence of tax is higher for poor people 
than for rich people; and patriarchal households pay less tax than egalitarian households. 
3.2.3 Transparency, Accountability and Participation 
Obligation of conduct  
The obligation is to ensure that tax laws and administration are transparent and 
accountable, and opportunities are provided for broad participation in public discussion 
about appropriate tax policy. Relevant indicators would relate to the complexity of tax 
law (especially provision for offsetting expenses of various kinds against tax liability); the 
provision of accurate information on the incidence of taxation; the presence of 
independent oversight of the tax authorities; and the scope of consultation about changes 
in tax law.   
Conclusion 
Compliance with obligations is questionable if tax laws are extremely complex, with 
many loopholes; if governments fail to publish accurate information about tax incidence; 
 
40 R. Balakrishnan, n. 5 above, at 15, 28. 
41 D. Elson, n. 1 above, at 77.  
42 R. Balakrishnan, n. 5 above, at 31. 
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if there is no independent oversight of the tax authorities and changes in tax laws are 
unduly influenced by rich and powerful corporations.  
3.3  Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy 
Fiscal policy (i.e. policy on the size of the budget deficit/surplus, and the extent of 
government borrowing) and monetary policy (i.e. policy on interest rates, regulation of 
the banking system, and exchange rates) impact on the economy as a whole by affecting 
levels of aggregate demand and the supply of money. The relation between aggregate 
demand and supply affects the level and quality of employment in an economy, the rate 
of inflation, and via the impact on both, the standard of living. Thus the macroeconomic 
aspects of fiscal and monetary policy have significant implications for the right to work 
and the right to an adequate standard of living.   
 A low official unemployment rate is not an adequate indicator of whether the 
right to work is being achieved. The rate of unemployment may be low, but available 
jobs may not generate sufficient wages to support adequate standards of living and may 
lack social protection. It is important to supplement unemployment rates with indicators 
of employment quality. ‘Full employment’ is best understood in qualitative as well as 
quantitative terms.  It is important to realize that there is a trade-off between full 
employment and stable prices. No market economy has been able to generate full 
employment and economic growth, without some degree of inflation. The task is to 
avoid high and increasing rates of inflation, but attempts to bring inflation to very low 
levels will jeopardize job creation and economic growth. It is possible to protect the 
standard of living of poor people in the context of moderate inflation by regularly 
uprating the minimum wage, welfare benefits and pensions, in line with rises in the cost 
of living, as measured by the retail price index. 
 Because fiscal and monetary policies entail different processes (with the former 
the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance, and the latter the responsibility of the 
Central Bank) we examine them separately with respect to obligations of conduct.  
However, to cross-check conduct with results, the same indicators of unemployment,  
decent work and adequate standards of living are appropriately used for both. 
3.3.1 Fiscal Policy  
Fiscal policy acts on aggregate levels of supply and demand, taking money out of the 
economy by levying taxes and other charges and putting money into the people’s hands 
by way of public spending. If total expenditure is higher than total revenue, there is a 
budget deficit, which has to be financed by government borrowing or credit  creation (an 
expansionary policy); if total expenditure is less than total revenue there is a budget 
surplus, and government debt can not only be serviced but also be reduced (a 
contractionary policy). Neoclassical economists tend to suggest that governments should 
aim to have balanced budgets (and if they have incurred high levels of debt through past 
budget deficits, they will need to maintain a budget surplus so as to generate savings to 
repay the debt). This is because neoclassical economists believe that market economies 
tend to produce full employment and low rates of inflation if left to themselves. 
Keynesian and other progressive economists challenge this. They believe that market 
economies have built in tendencies to private underinvestment in production, leading to 
a shortage of decent jobs. To sustain full employment, the lack of private investment in 
production needs to be offset by government investment, financed by government 
borrowing. So a deficit on the capital account of the budget is justified if it reflects 
government investment to increase assets and create decent jobs (which will in turn 
generate the revenue to pay the interest on the debt). Keynesians also consider that a 
deficit on the current account is justified in a downswing of the economic cycle, when it 
counteracts the danger of recession. This can be matched by a current account surplus in 
  
 




                                                
an upswing, to counteract dangers of inflation. Thus fiscal policy with respect to the 
current account of the budget should be actively countercyclical, expansionary in the 
downswing and contractionary in the upswing. This will be more likely to generate full 
employment and low rates of inflation.43 
3.3.1.1 Progressive Realization and Non-retrogression 
Obligation of conduct 
The audit needs to consider how far full employment and improvements in the standard 
of living are objectives of fiscal policy. Is conduct constrained by rigid rules that hamper 
achievement of these objectives, such as requirements for the budget to be balanced each 
year or requirements for a primary surplus in the budget, so as to be able to reduce 
government debt? Such rules are likely to hamper progressive realization and lead to 
retrogression when there is a downturn in the economy.  Or does the framework for 
fiscal policy allow government a margin of discretion to match fiscal policy with the state 
of the economic cycle and the investment and job creation needs of the country? A more 
flexible fiscal policy is less likely to hamper progressive realization, and less likely to entail 
retrogression. Comparisons over time and with similar countries are relevant. 
3.3.1.2   Transparency and Accountability and Participation 
Obligation of conduct  
The audit needs to consider how far fiscal policy is presented as a social choice, open to 
democratic deliberation, and how far as a technocratic calculation that only those with 
PhDs in economics can perform.  Any macroeconomic models used to guide policy 
should be publicly available and their underlying assumptions and objectives clearly 
articulated. Any fiscal policy conditions that are accepted in order to get loans from the 
IMF and the World Bank should be published. Accountability mechanisms should be 
available, including hearings in the legislature and through debate in the media and in 
universities. Fiscal policy should be open to public discussion, with consideration of a 
range of alternatives.  
3.3.2 Monetary Policy 
Monetary policy includes policy on interest rates, exchange rates, the supply of money in 
circulation, and regulation of the financial sector. Countries have, over the last decade, 
adopted monetary policies that focus on lowering inflation to historically low levels with 
little regard to the impact on poverty, employment, investment or economic growth. 
They have also liberalized financial markets, making it difficult to purse monetary and 
fiscal policies that do not meet with the approval of private sector financial institutions.  
Neoclassical economists believe that giving priority to lowering inflation will promote 
economic growth in the long run by providing a more stable financial environment for 
private investment. They advocate inflation targets for Central Banks, but not 
employment targets. They also believe that liberalization of the financial sector will lead 
to more efficient allocation of finance. Keynesian economists believe that an emphasis 
on very low rates of inflation is more likely to discourage investment, because it requires 
high rates of interest; and this in turn will hamper job creation and limit improvements in 
the standard of living  They point out that in the 1950s and 1960s, Central Banks paid 
attention to employment and the standard of living, and not just to inflation.44  
Keynesian economists also believe that liberalization of financial markets is likely to 
increase the risk of financial crisis, with harmful effects on job creation and sta
li
 
43 D. Elson, n. 1 above, at 103-4. 
44 G. Epstein, Alternatives to Inflation Targeting.  Monetary Policy for Stable Growth: A Brief Research Summary, 
(Amherst: Political Economy Research Institute, 2003). 
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3.3.2.1  Progressiv
Obligation of conduct  
As before, the audit needs to consider how far monetary policy is presented as a social 
choice, open to democratic deliberation. The obligation to progressively realize the  right 
to work and to an adequate standard of living implies that Central Banks should have 
regard to these objectives and not just to low rates of inflation. Due regard should be 
given to the risks of 
countries are relevant. 
3.3.2.2  Transpare
Obligation of conduct 
Procedure for appointing the Governor of the Central Bank and other key decision-
makers in the Bank (none of whom are elected) should be transparent. Public 
information should be made available about the rationale and underlying assumptions of 
any macroeconomic models used by the Central Bank. Mechanisms need to be in place 
to make the Central Bank accountable to the government and the legislature. Monetary 




Obligation of result 
The conduct of fiscal and monetary policy can be crosscheck
rights to work and the right to an adequat
Progressive Realization and Non-retrogression  
A range of indicators is required o
and availability of decent jobs e
Non Discrimination and Equality 
The releva
Conclusion 
Compliance with obligations is questionable if the goals of fiscal and monetary policy are 
purely financial, with financial targets, but no targets for job creation or improvements in 
standard of living; and if employment is deteriorating in terms of quantity, and/or 
quality, with an increasing number of jobs unable to sustain an adequate standard of 
living. Responsibility for non-compliance may be shared with other governments and 
international financial institutions, if the latter are constraining fiscal and m
in w  that hamper job creati
3.4 Trade Agreements  
Neoclassical economists argue that trade-liberalization will produce gains, in the shape of 
extra output, for all trading countries by stimulating their economies to be more efficient. 
Non-conformist economists doubt that trade liberalization will necessarily lead to overall 
gains: weaker less-developed economies may be damaged rather than stimulated. 
Neoclassical economists do recognize that not all groups within a country will gain; 
indeed some may lose (in particular, those groups producing goods that can be imported 
more cheaply following the trade agreement). In such a case, they argue that the gains 
should be redistributed from the winners to the losers, so as to ensure that no-one is 
worse off. In practice, if the winners are powerful, they may block any attempt to  
redistribute the gains within a country (e.g. if the benefits of trade go to better-off urban 
consumers who are able to buy cheaper imported food, urban consumers may block any 
attempt to tax them to compensate small farmers who lose their livelihood). A recent 
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but if it improves their position, then compensation for privileged losers 
nt, did the government introduce other measures to compensate them for their 
ups 
after the trade liberalization (employment, incomes, nutrition, health etc). 
 and limited access to their own 
                                                
development in trade agreements has been ‘side agreements’ relating to non-trade issues, 
such as labour rights, intellectual property rights, and government subsidies. In some 
cases, (e.g. Mexico and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)) the side 
agreements have even led to constitutional amendments which have weakened the rights 
of poorer groups. These side agreements may deprive poorer countries, and especia
poorer people within them, of many of the po
3.4.1 Non-discrimination and Equality 
A human rights perspective would situate the issue of compensation in the context of 
non-discrimination and equality: if trade liberalization worsens the position of those who 
are already suffering from discrimination and inequality, then measures should be taken 
to prevent this; 
is not required. 
Obligation of conduct  
In auditing this obligation it is important to investigate whether the government 
conducted impact assessments to determine who would be the likely winners and losers 
before concluding trade agreements. If the likely losers were groups already subject to 
discrimination and inequality, did the government ensure that the trade agreement was 
modified to protect them (e.g. by including in the agreement the ability to reintroduce 
import tariffs if livelihoods of discriminated groups are threatened by import surges or 
subsidized imports that are sold below cost)? Or failing modification of the trade 
agreeme
losses? 
Obligation of result  
To assess this, indicators are required on the situation of disadvantaged social gro
before and 
Conclusion  
Compliance with obligations is questionable if the state failed to make an impact 
assessment, and failed to introduce safeguards or compensatory measures to protect 
discriminated groups from losses, and if the situation of such groups worsens after trade 
liberalization. Responsibility may be shared with powerful trading partners if the latter 
refused to include safeguards in the trade agreements
markets in ways that minimized any gains from trade.  
3.4.2 Minimum Core Obligations/Minimum Essential Levels  
Trade liberalization may jeopardize the ability of states to meet their minimum core 
obligations to guarantee minimum essential levels of economic and social rights. In 
examining this, it is important to focus on the risk introduced by trade liberalization. 
Here, we illustrate this principle with respect to food security, since food is the most 
important essential that is importable. In the short run agricultural trade liberalization 
may result in an increase in food imports, leading to greater availability and lower costs 
for food, while at the same time destroying local production as small farmers are unable 
to compete against imports. But dependence for essential food items makes countries 
vulnerable to changes of prices in the world market. If the price of imported food rises, 
poor people may be priced out of markets, and the government may have insufficient 
foreign currency to buy food on their behalf. The neoclassical economist would expect 
this to be temporary, as the rise in prices should stimulate local production once more. 
But the local farming system may have been destroyed, with farmers having migrated to 
the cities, and local farming infrastructure in disrepair. The changes induced by trade 
 
45 R. Balakrishnan, n. 5 above, at 14-19. 
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run.  
Obligation of conduct  
The obligation is to ensure that trade agreements do not undermine the capacity of 








Compliance with the obligation is questionable if there are no safeguards and if food 
consumption and nutritional levels of poor people have deteriorated subsequent to the 
trade agreement. Responsibility may be shared with trading partners and multinational 
corporations, if they h
an
people in the country. 
 
4.  Limits and Potential of a Human Rights Audit of Economic Policies  
It is important to recognize that attention to human rights obligations does not provide 
the answers to all economic policy questions.46 What such attention can help us do is to 
define the set of policies that are consistent with human rights obligations, and to rule 
out policies which are not consistent. In choosing among the policies which are 
consistent with human rights obligations, human rights analysis can also provide some 
guidance on sequencing of policies (attention to the most deprived should have priority) 
and on procedures (which must be transparent, participatory and accountable). But it 
cannot provide definitive answers to questions such as: should priority in investment in 
public services be given to the urban poorest people or the rural poo
 that a given expenditure can reach more of the poorest urban people than the 
poorest rural people, because the latter are more spatially dispersed?  
However, it is equally important to recognize that an economic analysis cannot 
provide a definitive answer either. Many abstractions and simplifications have to be made 
in order to produce economic analysis, and weight must be allocated to competing policy 
objectives. The abstractions, simplifications and weights used in non-conformist 
economics are different from those used in neoclassical economics. The former gives 
greater priority to equality and guarantee of an adequate standard of living for all. It pays 
more attention to the inherent uncertainty and inequality of market processes, and the 
significance of non-market domains of life. Because of this, the analysis produced by 
non-conformist, progressive economics is likely to be more congruent with human rights 
norms and standards. However, no matter how progressive the economic analysis, the 
information it produces does not eliminate the role of social and political judgment. 
Judgment among competing human rights-consistent policies should therefore not only 
be informed by a progressive economic analysis but also be reached through a 
participatory, transparent and accountable process. However, the first step is to conduct 
analysis on whether current economic policies are consistent with human rights 
obligations, and to work towards clarifying a set of human rights-consistent policies. The 
 
46 V. Gauri, ‘Social Rights and Economics: Claims to Health Care and Education in Developing Countries’, 
(2004) 32 World Development 3 at 465-477. 
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